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Drew Carter, The University of Adelaide 
 
 
“In confrontation with another there is both risk and opportunity”.2  I take the risk and 
opportunity of replying to Michael Campbell, first by thanking him for the 
connections he has made and the re-examinations he has spurred me to undertake.  
Below, I discuss what I think are some key issues in the hope of advancing broader 
discussion of the resources and challenges that one encounters in attempting to apply 
insights made by Wittgenstein to thinking about moral matters.  I begin by rehearsing 
the critical thrust and motivation of my original paper.
3
  I then demonstrate why 
Campbell’s challenge to my interpretation of Wittgenstein’s expression ‘form of life’ 
is well-grounded, but also why it does not undermine my questions of Raimond Gaita, 
which can simply be reformulated.  I then examine what considerations might remove 
the need for my questions before trying to trace then add to Campbell’s line of 
thinking about what he calls the ‘inwardness’ of moral concepts. 
 
The questions that I asked in my original paper were mostly earnest rather than 
rhetorical.  I asked them in a spirit, first, of seeking to understand Gaita then, second, 
of inviting others to consider and, if possible, clarify what struck me as a potential 
inconsistency.  The potential inconsistency that I wondered at was as follows. 
 
                                                 
1
 I owe a special thanks to Andrew McGee for very instructive correspondence. 
2
 M. Campbell, “Inwardness and Sociability: A Reply to Carter,” Philosophical Investigations: 14. 
3
 D. Carter, “‘Part of the Very Concept’: Wittgensteinian Moral Philosophy,” Philosophical 
Investigations (36, 1: 2013): 37–55. 
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Gaita appears to flag two very different types of impossibility.  One type owes to 
grammar, that is, to connections between various concepts and responses, including 
behavioural responses.  X is ‘part of the very concept’ of Y or, perhaps better, X is 
part of our grammar of Y.  X is partly dependent for its meaning on Y.  Put yet 
another way – one also used by Gaita and, Campbell observes, first favoured by 
Wittgenstein – X is internally related to Y.4  The internal relation gives rise to a 
particular type of impossibility.  The other type of impossibility that Gaita appears to 
flag owes, not to our grammar, but to our human form of life or, it is fair to surmise, 
to basic facts about our human nature, broadly conceived, i.e. without assuming that 
this nature resides merely in shared physical or biological traits.  (Campbell 
unnecessarily attributes this assumption to me when he suggests that, on my account, 
a moral incapacity would be, “at root, a species of physical incapacity”.5)  Examples 
of basic facts about our human nature include the following.  Human beings normally 
do not and cannot fall passionately in love with flies, nor treasure fragments of cow 
dung as tokens of their lover’s affection.  On Gaita’s view, this being so is not a 
product of our grammar of love, namely the particular ways we have of speaking 
about love, showing love, responding to love, and so on.  Rather, it is just the way the 
world happens to be, which limits what grammars of love are possible for us. 
 
Flagging two very different types of impossibility, Gaita then appears to assign to 
particular impossibilities one type over another without any clear basis.  And, indeed, 
it struck me that any clear basis may not be attainable, thus throwing into question the 
value of distinguishing between the different types of impossibility.  Moreover, Gaita 
seeks to assign to moral impossibilities the type owing to grammar, ruling out the 
                                                 
4
 See “Inwardness and Sociability”: 2–3. 
5
 Ibid.: footnote 7. 
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possibility that moral impossibilities may, like other impossibilities, owe to our 
human form of life and, in this sense, constitute basic facts.  I asked whether this 
ruling out is consistent with what Gaita writes at some points and whether it 
represents the best account of what we experience as moral impossibilities or, by a 
different light, absurdities.  To press this question, I asked “Why do there exist no 
moral ‘mere facts’, defining our form of life?”6  And I suggested that this is a 
foundational question – indeed, “the central question” – to ask of Wittgensteinian 
moral philosophy.  Implicitly, I wondered whether the potential inconsistency that I 
had observed, in which some impossibilities owe to grammar but others to basic facts, 
betokened a problem with Wittgenstein’s thought or with Gaita’s extension of it. 
 
It is fair for Campbell to observe that I wondered at Gaita’s potentially “vacillating” 
or “oscillating” between two views.7  For the most part, Gaita’s writings suggest that 
the truth of moral judgement is relative to a particular grammar qua entire way of 
speaking and acting.  However, there are also passages in Gaita’s writings that 
suggested to me another view, namely the view that the content of some moral 
concepts, and thereby the truth of moral judgements evincing those concepts, is 
determined by features of our common life as human beings.  Campbell argues that 
both views fail to accurately characterise Gaita’s writings and, more broadly, the 
writings of Wittgensteinian moral philosophers, for reasons that I build up to. 
 
My original paper was partly motivated by my sense that, in discussion of moral 
matters, appeals to conceptual necessity – to X being ‘part of the very concept’ of Y – 
can be experienced as dogmatic or bullying insofar as one might respond ‘So I must 
                                                 
6
 “Part of the Very Concept”: 38, 55. 
7
 “Inwardness and Sociability”: 1, 7. 
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speak and act so?  What is going on if I disagree?’  For instance, Gaita writes that, in 
remorse for wrongdoing, one cannot be consoled by the like wrongdoing of others.  
One’s remorse for wrongdoing is not diminished by the like wrongdoing of others.  In 
this sense, there exists a “radical singularity” in remorse.8  This is part of the very 
concept of remorse or, perhaps better, part of our grammar of remorse.  It is a 
standard internal to our grammar of remorse.  For us, it is part of a remorse “worthy 
of the name”.9  By contrast, Gaita also writes that, in facing one’s mortality and 
vulnerability to suffering, one can be consoled by the like mortality and vulnerability 
of others.  There is no radical singularity here: “It is a fact utterly basic to human life 
that we are consoled by knowledge that others suffer as we do and must die as we 
must”.10  Gaita suggests that only the first consolation is morally corrupt.  The second 
is just a part of how things are (and one that we are not moved to oppose morally, at 
least internal to our particular grammar or, put differently, our particular morality).  
This can be experienced as dogmatic or bullying insofar as one may be prompted to 
ask the following.  Why does one consolation belong to how things are but not the 
other?  Why does moral corruption belong to one consolation but not the other?  Who 
is to say, and on what authority?  Campbell picks up this last question, which 
encompasses the question preceding it, and I examine his answer later.  The first 
question is a separate one, and I examine it first. 
 
 
The Meaning of Wittgenstein’s Expression ‘Form of Life’ 
 
                                                 
8
 Good and Evil: xxv.  Cited in “Part of the Very Concept”: 39. 
9
 “Part of the Very Concept”: 44, 50. 
10
 R. Gaita, The Philosopher’s Dog (Melbourne: Text Publishing, 2002): 72.  Cited in Ibid.: 53. 
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In my original paper, I took the term ‘form of life’ to refer to “those creaturely 
conditions we share that shape our grammar but are not, in turn, shaped by it”.11  
Campbell suggests that this interpretation of Wittgenstein’s expression is mistaken 
and that what I refer to corresponds, not to a shared form of life, but to “very general 
facts of nature”.12  Forms of life and very general facts of nature represent different 
ideas in Wittgenstein’s thought.  I think Campbell is right here and now examine why.  
In short, I used the expression ‘form of life’ when I might better have used an 
expression like a ‘scaffolding of facts’.  However, my original questions survive the 
reformulation. 
 
G. P. Baker and P. M. S. Hacker explain that the word ‘grammar’ was not intended as 
a technical term but, by use, given a sense that expands on that normally intended.
13
  
The rules of English grammar, for example, concern what makes sense but only for 
particular purposes.  Wittgenstein’s use of the word ‘grammar’ expands on those 
purposes.  Considered as the network of rules according to which our words make 
sense, ‘grammar’ can indeed strike one as less of a technical term.  However, the 
word is less apt and, as such, can strike one more as a technical term when it is used 
to encompass the rules according to which we make sense of, not only our words, but 
also our responses, behaviours and practices.  Indeed, it is especially in reflection on 
responses, behaviours and practices that we may reach for an expression like ‘form of 
life’ over the word ‘grammar’.  It may be that Wittgenstein simply used the 
                                                 
11
 “Part of the Very Concept”: 52. 
12
 L. Wittgenstein and G. E. M. Anscombe (trans.), Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell 




 See G. P. Baker and P. M. S. Hacker, Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity – Essays and 
Exegesis of §§ 185–242. Volume II of An Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations, 
2nd, extensively revised edition by P. M. S. Hacker (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 2009): “The 
Scope of Grammar”. 
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expression ‘form of life’ to help build a sufficiently rich notion of grammar, namely 
one encompassing more than just words. 
 
Baker and Hacker write that, like grammar, “The expression ‘form of life’ 
(Lebensform) is not a technical one ... The interpretation of Wittgenstein’s few 
observations has occasioned a certain amount of exegetical controversy.”14 The 
controversy concerns whether there are multiple forms of life among human beings or 
only one, namely the human form of life.  On balance, Baker and Hacker take 
Wittgenstein to use the expression to refer to something broadly cultural in scale: 
“There is no uniquely human form of life, characteristic of the species – rather there 
are multiple human forms of life, characteristic of different cultures and epochs.”15  In 
defence of their interpretation, Baker and Hacker quote Wittgenstein seeming to 
identify forms of life with “regular actions … regular forms of action”, out of which 
language “springs up … grows”.16  Grammar, then, may be said to comprise the 
network of rules according to which we find intelligible both regular forms of action 
(deeds) and the words that have grown out of these forms of action over time. 
 
Expressions that closely resemble ‘form of life’ can be found in Wittgensteinian 
moral philosophy: “ways of living”,17 “the kinds of life lived by human beings”18, “a 
                                                 
14
 Ibid.: 218–219. 
15
 Ibid.: 221.  Baker and Hacker also write “In short, human beings in different epochs, different 
cultures, have different forms of life. Different educations, interests and concerns, languages, different 
human relations and relations to nature and the world constitute distinct forms of life.”  Ibid.: 222.  See 
also P. M. S. Hacker, “Wittgenstein and the Autonomy of Humanistic Understanding,” in R. Allen and 
M. Turvey’s (eds) Wittgenstein, Theory and the Arts (London: Routledge, 2001). 
16
 Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity: 222. 
17
 R. Gaita, “Breach of Trust: Truth, Morality and Politics,” Quarterly Essay (16: 2004): 20.  Cited in 
“Part of the Very Concept”: 49. 
18
 P.Winch, Trying to Make Sense (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987): 164.  Cited in “Part of the Very 
Concept”: footnote 46. 
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certain style of life”.19  Expressions chosen by Gaita suggested to me that he had in 
mind a single human form of life.  For example, the kinds of things that can be 
treasured 
 




It is a fact utterly basic to human life that we are consoled by knowledge that others 




The suspicion that our actual speech may have false metaphysical implications is the 
suspicion that our human form of life may have shaped our speech in ways that disguise 
its serious and pervasive errors from us except at moments of philosophical reflection. 
But to be prone to that suspicion is not to notice the deepest of Wittgenstein’s lessons. 
That lesson is that our human life conditions not only our beliefs, but also, and more 
importantly, the only concepts that we have, or could have, with which we can express 




Gaita rarely uses the expression ‘form of life’, so it is unclear how he interprets 
Wittgenstein’s expression.  Furthermore, it is not always clear which of 
Wittgenstein’s ideas Gaita means to draw on, namely the idea of a form of life qua the 
regular forms of action that partly constitute a grammar or the idea of a ‘scaffolding 
of facts’, including facts about human nature or our creaturely condition, facts which 
limit but do not determine our grammar.  I take Gaita to at least sometimes draw on 
the second of these ideas.  As such, it is better to reformulate my original questions, 
                                                 
19
 Trying to Make Sense: 190.  Cited in “Inwardness and Sociability”: 9. 
20
 Good and Evil: 152.  Cited in “Part of the Very Concept”: 52. 
21
 The Philosopher’s Dog: 72.  Cited in “Part of the Very Concept”: 53. 
22
 Good and Evil: 296–297. 
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A Scaffolding of Facts 
 
Campbell writes of what is “humanly possible” and in other ways makes use of 
Wittgenstein’s idea of a scaffolding of facts.23  The word ‘fact’ risks misrepresenting 
the idea, insofar as a scaffolding fact is not subject to doubt like other facts on the 
understanding that we may prove mistaken (e.g. the room is four metres long).  In this 
respect, other expressions are preferable.  Wittgenstein also expressed the idea of a 
scaffolding of facts in terms of grammar’s broad, underpinning agreement in 
judgements, and in terms of grammar’s presuppositions, preconditions, framework 




On the Wittgensteinian picture, grammar is under-determined by a scaffolding of 
facts, and a scaffolding of facts makes a grammar neither correct nor incorrect but 
simply useful or useless.  I take Campbell to conform to this picture, indeed, in the 
mode of reminding me of it.  The picture serves to structure an answer to a question 
that Jeff McMahan asks of Gaita.  Gaita claims that “at the deepest point in our ethics 
there is a conception of individuality that is groundless, formed from our 
attachments”.25  McMahan then asks of this claim: “Does it imply that whatever we 
become attached to and deeply love (or even what each of us loves and is attached to) 
                                                 
23
 “Inwardness and Sociability”: 13. 
24
 See Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity: especially 211–212, 215, 218, 230. 
25
 The Philosopher’s Dog: 200.  Cited in J. McMahan, “Our Fellow Creatures,” The Journal of Ethics 
(9: 2005): 353–380: 378.  Cited in “Inwardness and Sociability”: 4. 
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thereby becomes precious and irreplaceable?”26  Gaita and, with him, Campbell could 
well answer as follows.  Yes, that which is irreplaceable is whatever we become 
attached to and deeply love.  However, what we are able to become attached to and 
deeply love is limited by our grammar of love, which we share with our fellows and 
which is sometimes extended by exceptional individuals, namely those in whom we 
register an authority.  Furthermore, like all grammars, the grammar of love can only 





My Questions Reformulated and Potential Answers 
 
My questions can be reformulated in line with this picture.  Gaita writes that “Not 
anything can be” loved.28  I replied with questions.  What can be loved?  And how do 
we answer this question?  There are impossibilities that owe to scaffolding facts and 
others that owe to grammar.  But how do we tell which is which?  Where does the 
scaffolding of facts end and grammar begin?  For instance, where does the first’s 
agreement in judgement end and the second’s regular forms of action begin?  If we 
struggle to answer these questions, then what implications, if any, does this have for 
                                                 
26
 “Our Fellow Creatures”: 379. 
27
 A question remains as to whether a scaffolding of facts, and not just a grammar, can change over 
time.  A scaffolding of facts comprises judgements that come naturally to us, agreement in which 
makes grammar possible.  I take Baker and Hacker to suggest that even a scaffolding of facts can 
change over time when they write that “What is unnatural here today for us may be natural elsewhere 
at another time for others”.  Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity: 342.  To my mind, this 
further prompts the question of where a scaffolding of facts ends and grammar begins.  Wittgenstein 
imagined a river-bed and its waters: “I distinguish between the movement of the waters on the river-
bed and the shift of the bed itself; though there is not a sharp division of the one from the other … the 
bank of that river consists partly of hard rock, subject to no alteration or only to an imperceptible one, 
partly of sand, which now in one place now in another gets washed away, or deposited”. L. 
Wittgenstein and G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright (eds), On Certainty (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2003): §97, §99. I thank Andrew McGee for alerting me to this metaphor. 
28
 Good and Evil: xxiii.  Cited in “Part of the Very Concept”: 51. 
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Wittgensteinian moral philosophy?  If we cannot agree on what to include among the 
scaffolding of facts, then there may be no point in having the idea at all. 
 
It is fair for Campbell to observe that there is no inconsistency in saying, on the one 
hand, that it is impossible to treasure fragments of cow dung as tokens of a lover’s 
affection and, on the other, that it is possible for someone to delight in a bare-foot 
slipping and sliding in cow dung.  There is no inconsistency, for this is simply to 
observe different scaffolding facts.  However, I raised the possibility of delighting in 
cow dung, or loving cow dung in the mode of delighting in it, as a means of pressing 
the above questions, namely ‘Who decides on what counts as a scaffolding fact and 
on what basis do they decide?’ 
 
There are a number of potential answers to these questions or, more precisely, there 
are a number of considerations which might remove the need for these questions.  
First, the mere fact that we encounter borderline cases need not be a problem.  We 
may encounter cases that we find difficult to judge or agree on with respect to which 
of two categories they belong to, but this need not undermine the categories 
themselves. Borderline cases do not render the categories incoherent or useless.  
Indeed, they are to be expected.  But what if every case strikes us as borderline?  If we 
are never confident to which an impossibility owes – our grammar or its scaffolding 
of facts – then this sorely challenges the relevance of the categories. 
 
Campbell implies a second potential answer to my questions.  There need be no clear, 
general basis for assigning to impossibilities one type over another.  The distinction 
between a grammar and a scaffolding of facts can be, to borrow an expression from 
11 
 
Baker and Hacker, “vague and purpose-relative”.29  Campbell writes that, for 
Wittgenstein, the purpose of observing scaffolding facts was “purely negative”.30  
Imagine if very general facts of nature were different.  Then you can imagine how our 
usual concepts would have no application and, indeed, would not have arisen.  We 
would have different concepts.  This helps us to appreciate how our concepts are not 
independent of very general facts of nature, like the fact that objects do not normally 
expand and contract in size every minute.  Our concepts – of size, length and width, 
for example –can be seen to depend, hinge, or build on such facts.  But we are not 
trying to put together a ‘positive’ list of all such scaffolding facts.  That is not our 
purpose, for we are doing philosophy: “We are not doing natural science; nor yet 
natural history – since we can also invent fictitious natural history for our purposes”.31  
We simply want to illustrate how particular concepts are not necessary but, instead, 
contingent upon very general facts qua agreements in judgement: “Such facts as 
mostly do not strike us because of their generality”.32  Baker and Hacker put it well: 
 
Philosophy investigates grammatical, conceptual structures, not the background 
preconditions that as a matter of fact [not hypothesis] make them possible. But the 





In other words, it is not for a philosopher to exhaustively answer the question ‘What 
can be loved?’  It is for a philosopher to observe what can and cannot be loved only 
when somebody transgresses the bounds of sense, bounds set by our grammar and, in 
                                                 
29
 Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity: 229. 
30
 “Inwardness and Sociability”: 8. 
31






 Baker and Hacker’s emphases.  Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity: 214. 
12 
 
some sense further down, by our grammar’s scaffolding of facts.  In this respect, it is 
for a philosopher to assemble reminders of the different ways in which we make sense 
of one another loving, as distinct from one another’s lusting, coveting and, further 
afield, hammering, erasing, and so on.  But it is just here that the question of bullying 
can arise.  On what authority does a philosopher observe that, in professing love, 
somebody has transgressed the bounds of sense? 
 
 
The ‘Inwardness’ of Moral Concepts, or My Life with Our Words 
 
This question equates to my earlier one, ‘Who decides what can be loved and on what 
authority?’  Campbell’s main answer to this question is, I think, consistent with the 
bulk of Gaita’s writings.  Who decides?  “We do”,34 collectively and individually, 
purely on the basis of the manifest absurdity of the alternatives and by the light of 
exceptional individuals who guide us with what strikes us as a particular authority.  
Campbell argues that the impossibilities I discuss in my original paper do not differ in 
type, as I took them to differ in Gaita’s writings.  In Campbell’s words, the 
impossibilities are each “a product not merely of features of a shared creaturely 
condition, but rather of the features of that condition as they occur within the lives of 
the individuals [concerned] and as they are understood by them”.35  In other words, 
the impossibilities each owe to our individual “lives with language” or, to use a 
different expression, to my life with our words.
36
  Perhaps both of these expressions 
do well to capture what Campbell means by the inwardness and sociability of moral 
concepts. 
                                                 
34
 “Inwardness and Sociability”: 14. 
35
 Ibid.: 13. 
36




Campbell endeavours to show how, for Wittgensteinian moral philosophers such as 
Gaita and Peter Winch, there are no concepts that are both moral in kind and 
inescapable among human societies simply given how things are.  The moral belongs 
to the grammatical and is thus limited but under-determined by a scaffolding of facts.  
Campbell describes Winch’s holding then later rejecting the view that some moral 
concepts are defined by features of our common life as human beings.  Winch 
rejected the view for two reasons.  First, let us “look and see”.37  Are we able to 
identify any concepts that are both common to all cultures and still “yet substantial 
enough” to qualify as moral in kind?38  It is “unlikely” that we can.39  The universally 
shared concepts would probably be so thin as to be empty, no longer substantively 
moral in kind.  Second, even apparently universal moral concepts have a certain 
inwardness that cannot be explained by the idea that moral concepts follow directly 
from features of our common life as human beings.  This second line of thought calls 
for tracing. 
 
Campbell presents Winch’s example of the moral concept of truthfulness, which 
Winch first thought to be defined by our common life as human beings: “there could 
not be a human society in which truthfulness were not in general regarded as a 
virtue”.40  In other words, the moral concept of truthfulness is a precondition for any 
human society to arise and endure and it is therefore defined by our common life as 
human beings.  Campbell presents R. F. Holland’s reply to Winch.  The only 
truthfulness explained by the existence of human society is one that merely “supports 
                                                 
37
 Philosophical Investigations: §66. 
38




 P. Winch, Ethics and Action (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972): 69.  Cited in Ibid.: 7. 
14 
 
the surrounding organisation or gets you by without disrupting the social pattern”.41  
However, a person’s striving to be truthful can comprise a “spiritual demeanour”.42  A 
person can strive to be truthful irrespective of how it helps society and irrespective of 
how it helps one in society.  What is the origin of such a striving and of the moral 
concept of truthfulness it evinces?  Such a truthfulness cannot be explained simply by 
reference to our common life as human beings, for it is not required as a precondition.  
For this reason, Winch came to think that no moral concepts follow directly from our 
common life as human beings. 
 
Moral concepts “can only be understood by seeing them in the context of the lives of 
their adherents”.43  Only such an understanding adequately accommodates the ways in 
which moral concepts “may be informed by the distinctive attitudes of especially 
committed individuals”.44  Particular attitudes are inexplicable when explanation is 
limited to gauging preconditions of our common life as human beings.  Therefore, as 
a moral concept, “The limits of love [for instance] are fixed by a combination of 
biological and grammatical features of our lives.”45  I take this ‘biological’ to refer to 
one particular scaffolding of facts.  Here we have the sociability of moral concepts, 
namely their shared, communal nature.  What is more, the limits of love, as of other 
moral concepts, are also “fixed by the responses of exceptional individuals”.46  Here 
we have the inwardness of moral concepts, namely their personal nature.  In moral 
matters, there is an important sense in which an individual, and not only a society or a 
people, affirms that something is ‘worthy of the name’.  It is in precisely this sense 
                                                 
41
 R. F. Holland, Against Empiricism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980): 107.  Cited in “Inwardness and 
Sociability”: 8. 
42
 Against Empiricism: 107.  Cited in “Inwardness and Sociability”: 8. 
43









that a moral philosopher may find herself providing not only a grammatical reminder, 
which “leaves everything as it is”,47 but also a personal invitation or exhortation, 
namely to reaffirm or newly adopt a particular grammar, in what may amount to a 
“reclamation” or “recuperation”, for instance.48 
 
Campbell observes that “grammar is not (and cannot be) under the control of any 
individual”.49  Individuals cannot impose or change rules for making sense of words 
and practices on a whim.  But individuals can, exceptionally, extend a moral concept 
or at least, in some vague sense, participate in the extension of a moral concept.
50
  In 
my original paper, I did not discuss at length the significance of  individual difference 
or “personal variance”51 in moral judgement, short of footnoting Gaita’s emphasising 
this
52
 and mentioning that, for Gaita and Christopher Cordner, something worthy is 
“that to which others have testified with an authority that, by the quality of their 
individual voices and lives, we are drawn to register”.53  I did write of moral 
judgement occurring, for Gaita and Cordner, not outside of but within a particular 
grammar, “even if at its open, fraying edges”.54  This admittedly unexplained and 
merely tantalising qualification connects, I think, to something Campbell has is mind, 
namely the ability of a grammar to change over time and for an individual to play a 
part in this. 
 
                                                 
47
 Philosophical Investigations: §124. 
48
 “Breach of Trust”: 65.  C. Cordner, Ethical Encounter: The Depth of Moral Meaning (Houndmills: 
Palgrave, 2002): 44.  Cited in “Part of the Very Concept”: footnote 26. 
49
 “Inwardness and Sociability”: 10. 
50
 See Ibid.: footnote 57. 
51
 Ibid.: 8. 
52
 See “Part of the Very Concept”: footnote 32. 
53
 Ibid.: 50. 
54
 Ibid.: 47. 
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What Campbell calls the inwardness of moral concepts also connects, I take it, to 
something Gaita and Cordner both emphasise, namely the seeming capacity of moral 
reflection and understanding to “deepen without limit”.55  What it means to make a 
promise, to love another, to be a “craftsman”, to have a “vocation” – each seems open 
to deepening without limit.
56
  Here grammar cannot be laid bare, made “perspicuous”, 
in the same way as in the case of, say, a ‘chair’.57  The explication or elaboration of 
moral concepts is different, more open-ended, and this may well be related to its being 
more personal, to living one’s “own life and nobody else’s”.58  Hacker writes: 
 
One cannot follow a rule which one does not know or understand. Hence the rules which 
determine and are constitutive of the meanings of expressions cannot be unknown, 
awaiting future discovery.  Rather they are exhibited in the humdrum, common or 
garden explanations of meaning given in teaching, in correcting misuses of expressions, 




In other words, “grammatical description merely makes explicit what is already 
known by competent speakers of the language – the humdrum standards of usage 
according to which they proceed”.60  There are some humdrum standards of use when 
it comes to moral concepts.  We can make use of them if called to explain why we 
said ‘loving’ instead of ‘hammering’ or ‘erasing’.  But it can be more involved to 
explain why we said ‘loving’ instead of ‘liking’ or ‘respecting’.61  The standards are 
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17 
 
less humdrum and more personal here, where the distinctions are finer.
62
  The felt 
need for fine distinctions in the case of moral concepts is not reducible to the need to 
agree on borderline cases.  Borderline cases can generate disagreement over the 
application of moral and non-moral concepts alike.  For example, is this an armchair 
or a lounge?  The point that I am making is different, and I take Campbell to remind 
me of it when writing, in relation to moral matters, of a “vivid sense”, “a distinctly 
personal form of understanding” that exceeds mere “competent participation within 
our culture”.63  Recall also Gaita’s “coming to see which of the concepts whose 
structure we can abstractly articulate are still available to us in living and authoritative 
speech.”64  Humdrum standards of use, which we might abstractly articulate, contrast 
with standards for living and authoritative speech. 
 
In conclusion, Campbell helps to clarify the picture of moral concepts advanced by 
Wittgensteinian moral philosophers.  At a general level, the picture remains unclear 
where a grammar meets its scaffolding of facts.  Some may find this lack of clarity 
unproblematic and, indeed, unavoidable.  However, I remain unsure of this and hope 
to have provided at least a useful caution, namely that care is called for when 
attempting to attribute something to a grammar or to a scaffolding of facts.  Questions 
also remain as to whether what Campbell calls the inwardness of moral concepts 
applies in any measure to non-moral concepts and as to what might be the 
implications, if any, for Wittgensteinian thought. 
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